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his chapter on "Fundamental Corporate Changes," he is not similarly disturbed
by the adverse consequences which can be forced upon minority stockholders
through charter amendment or merger.
Professor Lattin's book is very comprehensive for a one volume text; it has
the advantage of speaking in terms of modem cases and citations and contains
extensive references to modern business corporation acts. It indicates some aspects of the impact of the Internal Revenue Code and state and federal securities laws upon corporate law and practice. The presentation is, by virtue of the
size of the book, necessarily somewhat elementary and discursive; the treatment of the subject matter is not sufficiently intensive or documented to be
valuable as a reference work to the practicing lawyer. Professor Lattin's book
cannot be said to have achieved the high purposes set out in his statement of
purpose quoted at the beginning of this review. However, it is a competent introductory textbook, which covers a large mass of material in simple and understandable fashion.
STANLEY A. KAPLAN*
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

Foreign Law: A Guide to Pleading and Proof. By Otto C. Sommerich and
Benjamin Busch. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc. (for Parker School
of Foreign and Comparative Law), 1959. Pp. 170. $5.00.
Those who follow the recurring law review discussions of the problem of
pleading and proving foreign law will remember Messrs. Sommerich and Busch
as the authors of one of the more helpful contributions to that discussion.' The
theory that foreign law is fact, to be pleaded and proved as such, had long imposed unnecessary burdens on the administration of justice. In revolt against
those burdens, modern scholars, lawyers, and legislative draftsmen had turned
to the concept of judicial notice as a solution to the problem of ascertaining
foreign law. Without denying that substantial progress had resulted from the
employment of judicial notice, Sommerich and Busch counselled moderation
and common sense. Judicial notice, after all, could not accomplish miracles.
The problem of ascertaining foreign law, and of establishing it to the satisfaction
of a court, remained a formidable one. Knowledge of foreign law cannot be
bestowed on courts by legislative fiat; and considerations of fairness still dictate
that foreign law, like other matters that may have a decisive effect on the outcome of litigation, be determined in accordance with the traditions of the adversary process. Notice is still required, and the foreign law must still be ascertained in the fairest and most reliable way. Notice is best given in the pleadings,
and the fairest and most reliable way of ascertaining foreign law is by the examination of experts in open court. Hence Sommerich and Busch maintained
that, while judicial notice could be relied on to obviate some of the harshness

I Sommerich & Busch, Tiw Expert Witness andthe Proofof ForeignLaw, 38 CoRN. L. Q.125
(1953).
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and needless formality of the older regime, foreign law should still be pleaded and
proved.
The volume under review is an expansion of the article noted above, supplemented in such a way as to constitute a nearly complete handbook for the practitioner confronted with a case involving foreign law. In addition to reviewing
the common-law requirements of pleading and proof, the presumptions, and the
rise of judicial notice, the book contains detailed suggestions on proper pleading
and the examination of experts. It also discusses summary judgment, discovery,
and the ascertainment and application of foreign law in other countries. In general, this is a sound and helpful guidebook which may be recommended to the
lawyer who finds foreign law material to his case-and that, as the authors
rightly say, means almost every lawyer.
My reservations about the book are two only, and one of these may be summarily dismissed. The chapter entitled "When Foreign Law is Applied-Choice
of Laws," designed in an introductory way to explain how courts come to be
concerned with foreign law, is superficial in the extreme. Of course, it was not
to be expected that a small book devoted to the specific problem of pleading and
proving foreign law should contain any extensive treatment of conflict-of-laws
principles. This brief and shallow discussion, however, will give many readers an
erroneous impression as to the quality of the rest of the book and as to the
qualifications of the authors. They would have been well advised to omit it and
assume that the book's readers would possess an elementary understanding of
conflict of laws.
The other reservation is related to the first. Although such a book as this
cannot include a treatise on conflict of laws, the most fundamental problem associated with pleading and proof of foreign law relates to the consequences of
failure to comply with the requirements; and these cannot be properly understood without reference to some very fundamental and controversial questions
of conflict-of-laws theory. These questions are given inadequate attention. Like
most others before them, the authors tend to assume without question that foreign law becomes material whenever a case has a foreign aspect such that, according to a choice-of-law rule of the forum, foreign law becomes "applicable."
The foreign law thus becomes an essential ingredient of the claim or defense, and
failure to plead or prove it results in disaster, unless one of the presumptions can
be relied on; and, in international cases, the presumptions are of relatively little
help. Accepting this point of view, the authors are content with such cases as
Cuba R. R.v. Crosby and Walton v. ArabianAmerican Oil Co.,' and, indeed, have
reprinted in full the opinions in both of these cases as containing "the essence of
the basic law on the subject. ' 4 The prominence given these cases is regrettable,
2222 U.S. 473 (1912).

3233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956).

4 P. 3. Also reprinted is the opinion in Arams v. Arams, 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 251
(Sup. Ct. 1943), a very sensible one with respect to both judicial notice and the consequences
of failure to establish foreign law. The fact that this opinion is inconsistent with the Crosby
and Walton cases is not noted.
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as is the neglect of cases adopting a different view of the materiality of foreign
law.
Cuba R.R. v. Crosby is a monumentally unjust decision. The Walton decision
is only slightly less so. In each an American citizen sued an American corporation for injuries sustained abroad. In each the suit was dismissed because of the
plaintiff's failure to establish the foreign law. In Crosby the defendant made no
reference to foreign law until it filed its motion for a new trial. In Walton the
objection was suggested by the court at the outset. Let us agree with Sommerich and Busch that, despite judicial notice statutes, foreign law cannot be
relied upon unless it is pleaded and proved, or the equivalent. The plaintiff's
failure to plead and prove foreign law need not, however, result in the dismissal
of his case. The alternative is that the law of the forum will be applied unless and
until the defendant pleads and proves some aspect of the foreign law favorable
to him.5 This was, and is said to be still, the law of England.' It was certainly the
law of New York at one time,7 and it is very close to being the law that was
applied by Judge Walter in the authors' favorite case, Arams v. Arans.8 It is a
sensible and just rule, and there is good reason to hope that the courts in New
York and elsewhere will ultimately return to it. Yet the authors give it little
attention, apparently assuming that Crosby and Walton have settled the law to
the contrary.' They even undertake to defend the Walton case, suggesting that
"a total loss would have been avoided for the disabled plaintiff by ascertaining
the Islamic law through organizations dealing with Islamic culture in New
York City and Washington, D.C., such as the Islamic Mission of America, Inc.,
for the propagation of Islam, Brooklyn, N.Y., or through the Saudi Arabian
Consul, and by pleading and proving it through a person learned in the laws of
the Koran" (p. 104). As one who has expended some energy in attempting to
discover the relevant Saudi Arabian law from similar sources, I can testify that
it is neither an easy nor a rewarding task. But the authors adhere to their rather
sanguine attitude although the best that they-or any of us-have been able to
come up with the way of a statement of the relevant Saudi Arabian law is a
statement by Professor Joseph H. Schacht which they paraphrase thus: "The
disability damages would have been computed by an intricate system of ascertaining the percentage of loss, assuming the victim to be a slave, and taking that
percentage of the 'blood money' for a free man, and dividing the total in half, if
the plaintiff is a Christian or a Jew" (p. 104).
5 See Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 964 (1958).
6 See Currie, note 5 supra, at 967-70.
7Monroe v. Douglas, 5 N.Y. 447, 452 (1851); Savage v. O'Neill, 44 N.Y. 298 (1871);
Latham v. de Loiselle, 3 App. Div. 525 (1896), a'd 158 N.Y. 687 (1899).

8 Note 4 supra.

9 Indeed, the authors refer to such cases as Monroe v. Douglas and Savage v. O'Neill (note
7 supra) without seeming to realize that they stand for a principle inconsistent with Crosby and
Walton. P. 17.
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It is a sorry state of affairs when an American plaintiff is thrown out of an
American court because he does not establish a foreign law that is so nearly
unknowable, and that, if it is known, may provide a mere pittance calculated
according to barbarous concepts. One gathers that the reason why the authors
did not dwell on the injustices of Walton and Crosby is that they were concerned
in this book to deal with a "practical" subject in a "practical" way (p. 1). Is it
impractical, however, to suggest to American lawyers that our courts may return to the sensible and just course of applying the law of the forum when the
foreign law is not made to appear? If so, it can only be because the practical
sense of the American lawyer has been corrupted by the influence of an academic, imported, and highly conceptualistic theory of conflict of laws which is
quite inconsistent with the common law tradition.
BRcnNEsR

CuluRi*

* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.

Race Relations and American Law. By Jack Greenberg. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959. Pp. 481. $10.00.
Mr. Greenberg begins with the question: "Can the law alter race relations?"
and declares that his thesis is that "law often can change race relations, that
sometimes it has been indispensable to changing them, and that it has in fact
changed them, even spectacularly" (p. 2). He then provides rich documentation
and illustration for the oft made observations that laws do change, that these
changes are responsive to and creative of other changes in the "political, social,
economic, and moral" orders (p. 370), and that since 1938 there have been vast
changes in the legal institutions affecting race relations in the United States.
Mr. Greenberg has followed the general pattern established by M'yrdal, Rose,
and Sterner in An American Dilemma (1944). It is essentially a description of
how, since 1938, state law (in the broadest sense) in the United States has moved
away from substantial conformity to one of the major competing value-judgments about race relations in our society and into progressively closer conformity to the other, and a consideration of what additional legal arguments and
legislative and administrative actions might further reduce the gap between this
latter ideal and the norms applied by the agents of the state. In its narrowest
form, the progressively dominant value-judgment is that it is wrong to discriminate against any individual solely upon the basis of race. In its broadest
form, this value-premise states that it is wrong to differentiatebetween individuals solely upon the basis of race.
Again following An American Dilemma, Mr. Greenberg presents this narrowing gap in chapters three through ten as it affects each of several of the "main
categories of social activity" (p. 31): public accommodations and services (36
pages), interstate travel (18 pages), elections (19 pages), earning a living (54

